Friday, 30 December 2011

The reality of the Falkland Islands dispute - why quiet diplomacy matters more than willy waving...

Why the Falkland Islands are unlikely to be invaded again.
A perennial favourite headline of so many newspapers, particularly tabloids, is to proclaim that Argentina threatens the Falklands, that the Royal Navy couldn't possibly mount a task force again, and that western civilisation as we know it is threatened by the fact that a  territorial dispute exists between Argentina and the UK. For this inaugural analytical blog article, I want to try and look beneath the dispute, to try and examine the real level of threat to the Falklands, and to also explain why it is highly unlikely that the Argentineans could repeat 1982 without some spectacular investment, planning and luck.

Argentine Bellicosity
The Falklands are an election issue, and an easy means of unifying the Argentine people against an external wrong that must be righted. At its most simple, the dispute has little to do with any geographic claim, but instead provides successive Argentinean leadership figures with an easy means to distract attention from any internal domestic woes, or political problems.

Almost without fail, the Falklands will be mentioned in any Argentinean political campaign, usually to much alarm from the UK media, but this is as much a reality of Argentine politics as an election campaign is in the UK when the parties roll out the tired old cliches of protecting the NHS, investing and whatever else is the mantra of the day. In other words, to talk of the Falkands in an Argentine election is normal - its when they don't get brought up that we should start to worry.

In recent months, there has been much alarm in the UK over the fact that Argentina appears to be placing pressure on other South American countries to ban Falkland Islands registered vessels from ports, to increase pressure on the UK getting access for its military assets staging through South American countries, and to try to raise the issue at every opportunity in international fora.

The reality is that these efforts have achieved very little - international initiatives are commonplace, and many countries sign up to them, not because they passionately care about the issues at stake, but because it is easier to go along with something in order to keep your neighbour sweet, so you can call in the favour when you need it. It is highly unlikely that Brazil or Uruguay particularly care about the Falkland Islands, but they do care that they share borders with a large nation with a reasonable economy, and that annoying them over something like the Falklands is more hassle than its worth.

So, even though the press would have us believe that the world as we know it is threatened by these statements, the truth is that nothing has really changed, and that the dispute remains primarily one between the UK and Argentina. What could change this? In reality, it is hard to see a situation emerging where Brazil or Uruguay would willingly close access to their ports permanently, or send vessels to side with an Argentine cause - it would cause immense economic damage, and the potential political fallout would be enormous. Is Brazil seriously willing to risk isolating itself for an attack on a foreign nation in support of Argentine goals?

The reality is that we'll probably see Argentina continue to try to press the small advantages in local organisations, and see very verbose declarations which will then be seized on by the Argentines as evidence that others support them. Then, in reality, nothing will change and Argentina will continue as before. The moment that the UK should really begin to worry about wider South American support for the Argentines position is when they follow through on pledges, or begin to link wider diplomatic support or pledges of assistance to movement on the Falklands issue. Until this point, declarations are little more than worthless - great if you want to feel good about something, but in reality delivering nothing of tangible value.

UK Diplomatic Response
There are some who feel that the UK should be far more assertive over the falklands, and take a tougher line with countries that support the Argentine position. The question is what would this achieve? Having worked in the diplomatic arena, it is clear that while in the short term highly emotive statements make the originating country feel good about itself, it quickly causes more harm than good. If the UK threatened to sever relations, or cut off trade to countries which supported Argentinas stance, then what would actually be achieved? In reality such a move would isolate the UK in South America, do immense damage to our long term reputation in the region, and bring countries on the fence into the Argentine camp.

It is important to remember that diplomatic actions have very long term consequences - arguably the UK is still dealing with the aftermath of messy colonial incidents from the 19th century today as a result of its possession of the Falklands. If the UK sought to view its entire relationship with South America through the prism of the Falklands, then there is real danger that our longer term ability to influence, support and work with many countries would be harmed. Countries remember insults for far longer than compliments - in many ways diplomacy is like children at school arguing over who likes or hates one another the most. Flexing the UK muscle now would merely irritate and in the longer term, isolate us and do more harm than good to our position.

What can the UK do to counter the constant Argentine charm offensive? Well for starters it needs to be realistic about goals - the UK has to ensure it retains good relations with the continent to ensure that 8000 miles from home, 2000 people and 1500 plus service personnel remain safe, secure and with open lines of communication in perpetuity (or until the Falkland Islanders determine they want another way of life). Pissing off your neighbours, acting like the local bully and generally throwing your weight around won't achieve this - it will achieve the opposite.

The UK has to try to secure a form of quiet diplomacy in South America - an accepting policy which realises that other south American countries have to live with Argentina, and that they will sign up for things, but equally one which applies discrete threats / carrots / sticks at a point where nations will not be publicly humiliated, nor in a way which merely fuels Argentina's policy goals. This means not reacting in a manner which will make tabloid readers feel good about themselves, but which ensures continuity of access to ports, airports, logistical facilities and prevents South American nations from feeling isolated, humiliated and unwilling to make concessions to the UK.

The worst thing the UK can do now is to go on an aggressive diplomatic offensive - it would play straight into Argentine hands, and make our life much harder. Our primary goal is to keep the Falkland Islands secure and British for as long as they want to do so - this goal is much easier to achieve when other nations are unlikely to back Argentine actions.

In the next part of this article, we'll look at why the Argentines lack the ability to invade the Falklands, and also why, despite the best efforts of the Daily Mail, it is unlikely that a small team of special forces soldiers (even if they had escaped from a military stockade to the LA underground), could take out the UK garrison in one night.

Wednesday, 28 December 2011

Why the MOD doesnt really have 690 press officers, despite what the press think...

In todays press (28 Dec), there is a report based on a hansard answer suggesting that the MOD has 690 press officers. Cue massive complaints across the board, and perceptions that the MOD somehow has an entire batallion of press officers ready to do battle with the true enemy of fleet street. (http://newsnetscotland.com/index.php/scottish-politics/3960-mod-criticised-for-spending-on-media-personnel-in-wake-of-defence-cuts)

The reality is somewhat more prosaic - all units at any reasonable size have a press officer. Its usually a job given to whichever junior officer or SNCO isn't fast enough to get out of the way. The role is simple, try to turn the general activities of the unit into something which over time can be used across social media, press, networking sites and so on in order to show what the unit is doing, and how this adds value to the MOD, and justifies taxpayers spending money on it.

Larger units have their own more full time press officer (by full time I mean maybe a largeish chunk of the day is spent on these jobs), and at a more strategic level - e.g. maybe Division, Command or MOD HQ you'll see full time press officers. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, but the reality is that in the UK, very few staff do full time press work. There are embedded media teams in operational theatres, and a variety of full time press handlers in the MOD. Similarly, there are reservist media teams, manned by media professionals who are also members of the armed forces, and which handle media issues in their spare time.

The problem MOD has it that in media coverage, its actions will inevitably breach 'Humphreys first rule of war', namely that 'you are damned whatever you do as experts will show you how you should be doing it instead'. If the MOD chose not to have people doing media work, then no doubt there would be complaints across the board, people saying that they didnt understand how the MOD worked, or what it did with its people. The memories of the self righteous indignation of the press from 1982 are a classic reminder that the media will quickly turn on those who seek to deny it news.

However, by maintaining press officers, the department leaves itself open to ridicule and scorn by those who believe it is wasting money on this stuff, and there is no need to do so (usually the same people who'd complain when not allowed into an operational theatre).

The reality is a happy medium needs to be struck - the public have a right to know what the MOD does, and how its using taxpayers money. To this mandarins mind, engaging the services of under 700 people, for the most part on a part time basis, out of over 270,000 in defence isn't a bad way to keep the public involved. For this investment the MOD can try to show what it gets up to, can try to source new recruits and also help maintain the information offensive, which is as crucial an operational battle as armour or warships in the 21st century.

The final thought should be that if the MOD didnt employ press officers, then the papers would probably lead with stories of scandal about how dreadful it was that the MOD wouldnt tell anyone what was going on, and surely the public have a right to know...

Tuesday, 27 December 2011

Site introduction

Hello there, welcome to my defence blogging site.

This site came about as a result of immense frustration about the lack of sensible, balanced coverage in the media, and on the internet about defence related issues. I've been commenting for some years on sites such as ARRSE, and Rum Ration about the importance of defence, but also trying to put a bit of balance into things too.

My aim with this site is to use it as an occasional blog, talking about defence issues of the day, and trying to put longer thoughts together from time to time, which set out things that some media commentators may have missed.

I dont know how often I'm going to be able to update this site, but my intent is to do it as regularly as time permits.